Abstract
I
Frankfurt fi rst presents his hierarchical theory in his 1971 article, 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person'. The main pillar of this theory is the distinction between fi rst-order desires and second-order desires. A fi rst-order Sats -Nordic Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 1 © Philosophia Press 2004 desire is the simple "A wants to X", where to X refers to an action. A secondorder desire, on the other hand, is the refl exive "A wants to want to X", or in other words, the desire to hold a certain fi rst-order desire. Second-order desires may be of two kinds: First, a second-order desire may be a simple desire to hold a certain desire -without being moved to act by it. Second, it may be a desire that a certain desire be my will. Frankfurt calls the second kind of second-order desire for a "second-order volition." And "it is having second-order volitions, and not having second-order desires generally, that [he] regard [s] as essential to being a person" (FWCP, p. 16), 2 and to being able to enjoy or lack free will. For Frankfurt, then, "the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means … that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants" (FWCP, p. 20) . The question of freedom of the will does not concern the relation between what I want and what I do but rather the relation between my second-order volitions and my will. It is when my second-order volitions are not expressed in my will that my freedom of the will is frustrated.
The notion of a hierarchy of desires is meant to show that some desires are more truly the agent's own than others. Or that the second-order volitions in some sense are the self. We will later have to go into more depth regarding what second-order volitions more precisely are. But fi rst let us look at the "wanton" who in contrast to a person cannot enjoy or lack free will. A wanton is an agent who does not have any second-order volitions. He does not care about his will; that is, he is indifferent as to which of his desires moves him to act.
To explicate the difference between a person who has second-order volitions and the wanton who does not, Frankfurt gives an example of two drug addicts. 3 One of the addicts hates his addiction. But we cannot say that he does not want or does not have the desire to take drugs; then he would not be an addict. However, the hierarchical theory makes it possible to say that he does not want to want to take the drug. This addict has confl icting fi rst-order desires, but he also has a volition of the second order. Within this framework, then, we can speak of an unwilling addict. " [T] he unwilling addict may meaningfully make 3 Frankfurt mentions a third kind of addict, the willing addict, which I discuss below. the analytically puzzling statements that the force moving him to take the drug is a force other than his own, and that it is not of his own free will but rather against his will that this force moves him to take it" (FWCP, p. 18) . The other addict is a wanton. He does not care about being moved by his addictive desire. Because he makes no second-order volitions, there is no hierarchy among his desires -having and being moved by one desire is just as good as being moved by another for him. The wanton addict cannot be said to be a willing addict since he has no will at all. Regarding the wanton, then, the question of freedom of the will does not arise.
II
Frankfurt mentions three different conceptions of freedom in 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', without being very clear on the distinction between the second and the third. I fi nd it important to explicate the difference between these conceptions and will take them up in later discussions.
First, there is the idea of freedom of action:
(1) Freedom of action "is fundamentally a matter of doing what one wants to do" (FWCP, p. 19) . This is clearly not what Frankfurt is concerned with in his hierarchical theory. "It misses entirely … the peculiar content of the quite different idea of an agent's whose will is free" (FWCP, p. 20). We saw above that freedom of the will means having the will one wants. This statement, however, is ambiguous. And Frankfurt seems to draw two different conceptions of freedom from it. Following terms suggested by Zimmerman ('Hierarchical Motivation and Freedom of the Will', p. 356f), we might call these two conceptions, the avoidability conception and the want-satisfaction conception of freedom of the will.
The avoidability conception of freedom of the will involves the ability to do otherwise. In this it can also be called a power concept of freedom. Frankfurt is known for not holding avoidability as a necessary condition for moral responsibility and has made an infl uential argument for this view in his 1969 article, 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility'. In that article, however, he is only concerned with moral responsibility and not with advancing a particular view of freedom. Now, consider this defi nition of freedom of the will from the 1971 article: A person's will is free only if he has the will he wants. This means that with regard to any of his fi rst-order desires, he is free either to make that desire his will or to make some other fi rst order desire his will instead. Whatever his will, then, the will of the person whose will is free could have been otherwise; he could have done otherwise than constitute the will as he did (FWCP, p. 24) .
On this conception freedom of the will not only requires harmony between second-order volitions and fi rst-order desires, but also that I could have chosen otherwise. Furthermore, this conception seems to imply that second-order volitions have causal effi cacy. My second-order volitions have causal effi cacy in this account in the sense of being able to determine which of my fi rst orderdesire becomes effective -in making it my will -but not in the sense of creating or generating (new) fi rst-order desires. For short, (2) Freedom of the will, the avoidability conception: my will is free when and only when I have the will I want if I could have constituted it otherwise than I did.
To explain the want-satisfaction conception of freedom, consider a third kind of addict -apart from the unwilling addict and the wanton addict -the willing addict. "The willing addict's will is not free, for his desire to take the drug will be effective regardless of whether or not he wants this desire to constitute his will. But when he takes the drug, he takes it freely and of his own free will" (FWCP, p. 24f, emphases added). It is not entirely clear how to understand this. On the one hand, the willing addict's will is not free; on the other hand, he does have the will he wants to have. But what does it mean for a person to do something "of his own free will" when his "will is not free"? In contrast to the wanton, the willing addict has a second-order volition endorsing his fi rst-order desire. And there is harmony between his second-order volition and his fi rst-order desire. But the case of the willing addict does not satisfy (2), since he could not have constituted his will otherwise. Let us formulate this conception as follows:
(3) Freedom (of the will?), the want-satisfaction conception: a person is free when and only when he does what he does of his own free will, even if he could not have had another will. Now, Frankfurt is not at all clear on whether (2) or (3) is the most important for his hierarchical theory. Is it that the effective fi rst-order desire is caused by -or more precisely, caused to be effective by -my second-order volition (2)? Or is it that my will is in accordance with my second-order volition? At one point Frankfurt seems to say that it could be either of the two: "it is in the discrepancy between his will and his second-order volitions, or in his awareness that their coincidence is not his own doing but only a happy chance, that the person who does not have this freedom feels its lack" (FWCP, p. 20-1, emphasis added). But clearly it matters whether it is the one or the other.
One thing is clear, however; namely that Frankfurt thinks the weaker (3) is suffi cient for attributing moral responsibility. Frankfurt sees the willing addict as responsible for taking drugs. Because the willing addict wants the desire to take drugs to be effective, "he has made this will his own. Given that it is therefore not only because of his addiction that his desire for the drug is effective, he may be morally responsible for taking the drug" (FWCP, p. 25). Frankfurt makes a distinction between what is required for freedom of the will and for moral responsibility. But moral responsibility is only of minor concern for Frankfurt in 'Freedom of the Will'; his main concern is freedom of the will. And Frankfurt only calls (2) freedom of the will.
I have dealt at some length with these distinctions because they seem to have been neglected in much of the literature, 4 and especially in order to make it clear that Frankfurt in his later elaboration and refi nement of his theory seems to drop (2) in favor of (3). What I want to emphasize here is that it is (2) and not (3) Frankfurt sets forth as defi ning freedom of the will. And if Frankfurt drops (2), the question arises whether he is talking about freedom of the will at all.
III
We have so far neglected the question of what is so special about secondorder desires and volitions. There is a reason for this: Frankfurt is in his 1971 article very vague about what makes second-order desires special. He is not clear on what makes them qualitatively different from fi rst-order desires and thereby why they are essential for freedom of the will. There are two closely connected problems related to this vagueness. First there is the objection raised by Gary Watson: "Can't one be a wanton, so to speak, with respect to one's second-order desires and volitions?" ('Free Agency', p. 108). In other words, couldn't the second-order desires and volitions just be something one happens to have without it involving any freedom that one has them? Second, there is the problem of infi nite regress. That is, the problem of how we avoid ascending to higher and higher orders to fi nd the real self without cutting the sequence off arbitrarily.
IV
Frankfurt has tried to deal with these objections in 'Identifi cation and Wholeheartedness' and 'The Faintest Passion'. In this section I reconstruct the argument of the fi rst of these articles; in section V, I reconstruct the arguments of the second. I shall then, in section VI, discuss whether Frankfurt meets the objections.
Frankfurt concedes that the fact that a desire is of a higher order is not suffi cient to establish its authority. He therefore takes it upon himself to show when a higher-order volition "itself is one by which the person really wanted to be determined" (I&W, p. 166). Frankfurt also notes now that our freedom is not only frustrated when there is a confl ict between higher-order volitions and effective fi rst-order desires or between volitions and will. For there is another sort of inner division. This second division manifests itself as "a lack of coherence within the realm of the person's higher-order volitions themselves" (I&W, p. 165). Whereas the fi rst sort of division is external to the volitional complex, the second sort of division is internal to it. In the second case, it is the agent himself who is divided. The problem we face now is how we can say that a higher-order volition is truly the agent's own, that the agent is not a wanton with regard to these volitions. So for a person to be free not only requires that he acts in accordance with a higher-order volition, but also that the higher-order volition itself is one by which the person wants to be determined. The person must not only have the will he wants but also the volitions he wants.
In 'Identifi cation and Wholeheartedness', Frankfurt puts great emphasis on the idea of making a decision. The point of decision is the point of cutting off the ascent to higher orders (I&W, p. 170). I think this idea of making a decision gives a very "activist" way of looking at freedom, and below I shall argue that it contrasts with the more passive idea of being satisfi ed as that which constitutes freedom.
Frankfurt wants to show that "making a decisive commitment does not consist merely in an arbitrary refusal to permit an interminable ascent to higher orders" (I&W, p. 167). He invokes notions like endorse, support and wholeheartedly want to designate this decisive commitment (I&W, p. 163) . In order to illustrate how an agent may come to endorse or identify himself with a volition, and thereby make a decisive commitment, Frankfurt takes as an example a situation of a person who tries to solve a problem in arithmetic. The person performs a calculation, after which he may perform any number of calculations to check the answer. If the person at some point decides for some reason to adopt a result without reservation, "he has made a genuinely unreserved commitment to the view that adopting the answer is his most reasonable alternative, he can anticipate that this view will be endlessly confi rmed by accurate reviews of it" (I&W, p. 168). "The fact that a commitment resounds endlessly", Frankfurt continues, "is simply the fact that the commitment is decisive. For a commitment is decisive if and only if it is made without reservation, and making a commitment without reservation means that the person who makes it does so in the belief that no further accurate inquiry would require him to make up his mind" (I&W, p. 168-9) . To identify with a second-order volition, then, is to commit oneself to it endlessly and without reservation.
Frankfurt argues that there is nothing arbitrary in terminating a sequence of evaluation at the point "at which there is no confl ict and doubt" (I&W, p. 169). This point is the point of decision, the point of cutting off (the etymological meaning of "to decide" is "to cut off", I&W, p. 170). I said above that the solution to the problem of incoherence within a person's volitional complex requires that we can distinguish between desires that are integral to the person and those that are not. This question concerns when we can say that a desire really is the agent's own, or in other words when we can say that it is the agent who freely acts. It is at this point we can see Frankfurt's "activist" conception of freedom:
The decision determines what the person really wants by making a desire on which he decides fully his own. To this extent the person, in making a decision with which he identifi es, constitutes himself. The pertinent desire is no longer in any way external to him. It is not a desire he 'has' merely as a subject in whose history it happens to occur, as a person may 'have' an involuntary spasm that happens to occur in the history of his body. It comes to be a desire that is incorporated into him by virtue of the fact that he has it by his own will (I&W, p. 170).
Here the person constitutes himself by making a decision about his fi rst-order desires. He is free because he has endorsed a fi rst-order desire by an act of will as truly his. Let us try to formulate this as a defi nition of freedom.
(4) Freedom as constitutive decision: A person is free when and only when he constitutes himself by the act of making a decision to make a desire fully his own.
This formulation should not be misunderstood so as the person can constitute himself any and all ways he likes. Frankfurt does not think we can form our character as we wish. A person is not free to causally create his own character; he can only take responsibility for his characteristics by making a decisive identifi cation with them (I&W, p. 171).
The weakness of the account focusing on constitutive decision is that it ignores the possibility of unwitting decisions with which the person does not identify.
5 Or we might say that it is possible to make decisions with which one is not satisfi ed. Seeing this objection, Frankfurt later abandons the notion of identifi cation as a kind of decision in favor of an account based on the idea of being satisfi ed.
V
In 'The Faintest Passion', Frankfurt elaborates on the issue of volitional unity and division. Here too his concern is to avoid the problem of an arbitrary cutoff and of infi nite regress but he now takes a different approach than the one focusing on the importance of making a decision. To this end he invokes the notions of wholeheartedness and ambivalence. I think we can see these two notions as analogous to the person and the wanton in 'Freedom of the Will' but at the level of higher-order, refl ective attitudes. A person is wholehearted when there are no confl icts among his higher-order volitions, when he is not ambivalent. Ambivalence means that the will is divided. 'This volitional division keeps [the ambivalent agent] from settling upon or from tolerating any coherent affective or motivational identity' (FP, p. 99). About an ambivalent person there can be no truth, for there is no psychic position with which he identifi es.
Apart from being the opposite of ambivalence, Frankfurt invokes the idea of being satisfi ed to explain what wholeheartedness means. The idea of wholeheartedness is also meant to give a fuller understanding of the notion of identifi cation. A person is wholehearted with respect to his psychic elements when he is "fully satisfi ed that they, rather than others that inherently (i.e. noncontingently) confl ict with them, should be among the causes and considerations that determine his cognitive, affective, attitudinal, and behavioral process" (FP, p. 103). It is important to understand exactly what being satisfi ed means here in order to see how Frankfurt thinks it could solve the problem concerning infi nite regress. The state of being satisfi ed must be a state from which the person will not ascent to higher orders. Frankfurt, therefore, holds that " [b] eing genuinely satisfi ed is not a matter … of choosing to leave things as they are or of making some judgment or decision concerning the desirability of change. It is a matter of simply having no interest in making changes" (FP, pp. 104-5).
Frankfurt connects this argument to the hierarchical account in the following way. The hierarchical account builds on the idea that freedom is related to the identifi cation with a higher-order desire endorsing a fi rst-order desire. But the preceding argument shows, "[t]he endorsing higher-order desire must be, in addition, a desire with which the person is satisfi ed" (FP, p. 105). The conception of freedom that follows from this is something like this: (5) Freedom as self-satisfaction: I am free when and only when I am satisfi ed with my endorsing higher-order desires.
VI
Does Frankfurt meet Watson's charge that one can be a wanton with respect to one's second-order volitions with his idea of being satisfi ed? I think not. I shall argue why. In doing so I shall both go into a more detailed analysis of Frankfurt's argument in 'The Faintest Passion' and relate this argument to his earlier arguments, which I reconstructed above.
It is instructive to compare what it is to be a wanton to what it is to be a satisfi ed person; the one being the paradigm of non-freedom for Frankfurt, the other of freedom.
6 A wanton is an agent who has no second-order volitions, "he does not care about his will" (FWCP, p. 16). The wanton is characterized by passivity with regard to his desires. Only the person is active since it is impossible to be a passive bystander to one's second-order volitions (TCFA, p. 54). The satisfi ed person is satisfi ed with her psychic elements, which must mean that she is satisfi ed with the desires she has whatever order they may be. It is important for Frankfurt to construct the satisfi ed person so he need not form any higher-order desires in order to determine whether he is satisfi ed; for only in this way can he avoid infi nite regress. "There is nothing that he needs to think, or to adopt, or to accept, it is not necessary for him to do anything at all" (FP, p. 104). "Perhaps his condition could be improved at no net cost, and perhaps he is aware of this, but he simply does not care" (Ibid.). This description of the satisfi ed person seems to come very close to the passivity characteristic of the wanton.
Frankfurt explicitly rejects this -of course. What self-satisfaction requires, according to Frankfurt, is that psychic elements of certain kinds do not occur. But while the absence of such elements does not require either deliberate action or deliberate restraint, their absence must nonetheless be refl ective. In other words, the fact that the person is not moved to change things must derive from his understanding of and evaluation of how things are with him. Thus, the essential non-occurrence is neither deliberately contrived nor wantonly unselfconscious (FP, p. 105) .
But what does "refl ective" mean here? And how can one be refl ective without recourse to higher orders? In 'Freedom of the Will', Frankfurt saw "refl ective self-evaluation" as "manifested in the formation of second-order desires" (FWCP, p. 12). And in 'Identifi cation and Wholeheartedness', he says, "it is not clear to me that adequate provision can be made for refl exivity without resorting to the notion of hierarchical ordering" (I&W, p. 165, n7) . Now with regard to being satisfi ed he also speaks of refl ection and evaluation of the self, but now it is meant to show that there is no need for recourse to higher orders. But it is not clear how adequate provision can be made for refl exivity without recourse to higher orders. Furthermore, how can a person evaluate "how things are with him" without "making some judgment or decision concerning the desirability of change" (FP, p. 104f)? Doesn't any evaluation involve a comparison?
Frankfurt seems to be making two points with each their purpose. These two points can be seen as two different explications of self-satisfaction in (5).
(5a) Satisfaction with one's self does not require the agent to do anything at all. This is meant to show that there is no danger of regress.
(5b) Satisfaction with one's self requires the refl ective absence of certain psychic elements. This is meant to show that the satisfi ed person is not a wanton.
The problems I have pointed out above seem to stem from the irreconcilability of these two points.
So let us analyze closer what it is to be self-satisfi ed. "Satisfaction with one's self requires," Frankfurt writes, "no adoption of any cognitive, attitudinal, affective, or intentional stance … Satisfaction is a state of the entire psychic system" (FP, p. 104). That I am satisfi ed with my psychic state, then, cannot mean that I have formed an evaluation of this state representing my true self, nor can it mean that I desire this state. I have formed no intention about this state, nor do I have any attitude towards it. I just happen to fi nd myself satisfi ed. How can this passivity be constitutive of free will? It clearly is at odds with the activist understanding of freedom expressed in (4). On that understanding the person constitutes himself by making a decision about his fi rst-order desires. He is free because he by an act of will has endorsed a fi rst-order desire as truly his. But on the satisfaction account there can be no such self-constituting acts with regard to higher-order desires, for towards these there are no taking a stance. Satisfaction on Frankfurt's account is just something that happens to occur. So what does satisfaction have to do with free will? Frankfurt might object by reminding us of the requirement that absence of certain psychic elements must be refl ective and self-evaluative. But I simply cannot see how this requirement is possible without taking a stance. Now we must consider how the idea of being satisfi ed relates to the basic framework of the hierarchical theory, which I summarized in section I, and specifi cally to the different conceptions of freedom distinguished in section II above. I think this move is justifi ed because Frankfurt does not present the idea of being satisfi ed as an alternative to the hierarchical account. Being satisfi ed, as we saw, is something the free person must be in addition to forming endorsing higher-order desires. Furthermore, there is a need to understand how the later account relates to the ambiguity in the earlier understanding.
It seems clear that the idea of being satisfi ed cannot be reconciled with what I called the avoidability conception of freedom of the will, (2) above. (2) is a power concept of freedom. On this view the ability to have the will I want requires that I have the power to make my fi rst-order desires conform to my second-order volitions. This power is something I either have or do not have, if I do I am free, if I don't I am not. But now Frankfurt tells us that the higherorder desire in addition must be a desire with which the person is satisfi ed. If I am satisfi ed I am free, if I am not satisfi ed I am not free. But I have no power over whether I am satisfi ed or not. The problem is that this powerlessness goes all the way down, as it were. For the whole purpose of the idea of satisfaction was to show that my higher-order endorsements were really free, that they represented what I really wanted. Since it is only when I am satisfi ed with my endorsing higher-order desires that I am truly free, it is of little consequence that I have the power to have the will I want. So if satisfaction is outside my power, the consequence of Frankfurt's argument is that I have no free will. For recall that (2) was the only conception of freedom, Frankfurt calls freedom of the will.
The other candidate for a conception of freedom on the earlier account is the want-satisfaction conception, (3) above. According to (3), a person can be said to do something freely even if he could not have done otherwise. This view seems more readily reconcilable with (5). The powerlessness of satisfaction sits more easily with the powerlessness of the willing addict. But is this a plausible understanding of freedom? I have some diffi culty in seeing the willing addict as free. It seems to me that an account of freedom ought to be capable of showing that something like addiction is an obstacle to freedom. Frankfurt could show this with (2), but he has given up on this conception.
In a review of the hierarchical theory, Gary Watson points to one of its possible merits that it can show that "addictive behaviour is hardly an instance of autonomy" ('Free Action and Free Will', p. 147). According to Watson there is "a general connection" in Frankfurt's account of freedom between (i) dependency between fi rst-order desires and second-order volitions, and (ii) alternative possibilities defi ned relative to higher-order volitions. But he notes that in cases of overdetermination, like in the case of the willing addict, "the connection will not hold" ('Free Action and Free Will', p. 148) . I can see the appeal of the hierarchical theory with regard to the unwilling addict; in that case the hierarchical account can show how a person's freedom is frustrated by dissonance between second-order volition and effective fi rst-order desire. But with regard to the willing addict it is hard to see how the hierarchical account could explain addictive behavior as unfree when (2) is abandoned.
VII
The uneasiness of accepting the willing addict as free can be explained in terms of a criticism of Frankfurt made by Richard Double. Double's criticism is aimed at the decisive commitment account, but I think it applies to the satisfaction account as well. Double's objection to Frankfurt's way of addressing the identifi cation problem is that it at best provides only a subjective criterion for determining when choices 'belong' to agents … Frankfurtian decisive identifi cation may be suffi cient to establish that choices are psychologically free, that is, that agents feel free in making them. But decisive identifi cation seems to go no distance toward establishing that agents are really or normatively free, since one can easily imagine such decisiveness exemplifi ed by grossly irrational, unfree agents. (Double, 'A Compatibilist Account of Free will', p. 34) For this reason Double thinks hierarchical accounts require "a strong rationality component" (Ibid. p. 35). Double develops a theory to deal with local and global controllers but I shall stick to the case of addiction. Double identifi es fi ve autonomy variables failure among which "raises the possibility that one's choices are not under one's reasoned control" (Ibid., p. 49). These are self-knowledge, reasonability, intelligence, effi cacy, and unity of agent (see summary, ibid., pp. 38, 48) . I shall attempt to show what these might mean for the case of the willing addict. Self-knowledge requires that we know our mental states, that we have true beliefs about them. The interesting case here concerns self-deception (Ibid., p. 40). Suppose an addict believes that the only reason why he takes drugs is that he really wants to do so. This seems to be a very probable case. He believes that he has endorsed his fi rst-order desire to take drugs freely. But in fact he has adapted his second-order volition to his irresistible fi rst-order desire.
7 "Reasonability is the motivation to critically evaluate one's beliefs, desires, and choices" (Ibid., p. 38). Critically, reasonability implies that I evaluate my beliefs impartially. Thus, the addict to be reasonable must evaluate his addiction irrespectively of his inclination towards taking drugs. If his higher-order endorsement of his desire to take drugs is itself a result of his addiction he is unreasonable. "Intelligence is skill at gaining, retaining, and using knowledge, both about oneself and the world" (Ibid., p. 38). Regarding the addict suppose that he (1) has a fi rst-order desire to take drugs; (2) knows that taking drugs causes early death; (3) does not want to die prematurely; (4) holds (3) stronger than (1); and (5) concludes that he endorses his addiction. 8 If one lacks the intelligence to see the contradiction in this line of reasoning, it is diffi cult to see what makes his endorsement a free one. "Effi cacy is the power to control our mental states (including our choices)" (Ibid., p. 38). It "is the power to actually make self-knowledgeable, reasonable, and intelligent choices" (Ibid., p. 44). Finally "unity implies that there is a single agent underlying free choices" (Ibid., p. 38). It is "the requirement that the other four variables apply to the same agent" (Ibid., p. 46). I do not think this last point adds anything to Frankfurt. Does this account give us a possibility of giving a better account of the willing addict than Frankfurt's account did? I think it does. First of all I should note that the autonomy variables do not tell us whether an addict is free without a further analysis of what addiction is. If addiction in itself prevents the satisfaction of the autonomy variables, addiction clearly makes addicts unfree. Double's account helps us to give a better account of the willing addict, I think, because it supplies some questions we would like to ask about the addict. Does the willing addict deceive himself about his desires? Is his higher-order volition merely an adaptation to an irresistible fi rst-order desire? Does he know what he is doing? Has he made an intelligent decision to take drugs? It is only when we know the answers to these question that we can make a judgment as to whether the willing addict is free or not. The uneasiness we might have about Frankfurt's bare statement that the willing addict takes drugs freely since he wants to want to take drugs (and is satisfi ed with this state) is a result of these questions remaining unanswered.
Double's autonomy variables may seem to be mainly epistemic in nature while I criticized the idea of being satisfi ed as being a passive state. But the epistemic goes together with the active in Double's account. In the case of self-deception, the agent adapts his second-order volitions unconsciously and hence passively to his fi rst-order desire. There is no active involvement on the part of the agent. Lack of reasonability is also a state of passivity because it involves not critically evaluating one's desires. And so forth. It is only if we have a unifi ed agent that reasonably, intelligently and with self-knowledge has the power to control her mental states that we can speak of free will. The problem with Frankfurt's satisfaction account is that it excludes a consideration of these active elements in identifying one's will.
I have in the last few sections argued that it is diffi cult to see the willing addict as free just because there is no confl ict between his second-order volition and fi rstorder desire. I have insinuated that Frankfurt could have solved the problem if he had held on to (2). But I think it is also possible to make a different argument that does not rely on the possibility of having formed one's will differently. 9 We can formulate the point using Frankfurt's own point in his critique of the principle of alternative possibilities. In that connection Frankfurt makes a distinction between doing something only because one could not have done otherwise, and doing something one is unable to avoid doing (APMR; TCFA, p. 51f). In the latter case a person does "something in circumstances that leave him no alternative to doing it, without these circumstances actually moving him or leading him to do it" (APMR, p. 2). My point is that the hierarchical account is not suffi cient to making this distinction, it cannot tell when a person does something because of the circumstances and when he does something unavoidable independently of the fact of its unavoidability. Frankfurt, of course, thinks that when there is confl ict between second-order volition and effective desire, then one does what one does because of circumstances, the person is moved to do it despite of himself. But that is not suffi cient for assessing the case where there is harmony between fi rst-order desire and second-order volition, for there is no way to tell whether this harmony is a result of not being able to do otherwise or is formed freely. The application of Double's autonomy variables in the preceding section showed this. It is only by investigating whether these conditions are met that we can know whether the person is passively responding to the unavoidable or actively endorsing it.
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